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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the appellate court pursuant 
to § 78-2a-3, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND 
RULES 
The following are the citations for the constitutional provi-
sions, statutes ordinances and rules which Defendant cites herein 
that may be determinative of the issues presented in this brief. 
Each provision, statute or rule is set forth in its entirety in 
the attached addendum. 
Statutes: 
§78-45-7.7 Utah Code Annot. (1990) 
§78-45-7.8 Utah Code Annot. (1990) 
Constitutions: 
Constitution of the United States 
Articles 5 and 14 
Constitution of the State of Utah 
Article 1, §§1, 6, 11 and 24 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court did abuse its discretion in awarding 
visitation based upon Appellant/Defendant's prior history of 
extended visitation which was controlled by Appellee/Plaintiff. 
Visitation as established by the trial court severely limits the 
ability of the Defendant and children to maintain their 
relationship, maintenance of which is in the best interests of the 
children. 
2. The fixed day care expenses set by the trial court is 
inappropriate as it denies Defendant the protections allowed under 
statute and requires him to pay day care when the children are not 
with the day care provider* 
3. Plaintiff has no basis or need, in law or fact, for an 
award of her attorney fees and costs incurred in the defense of 
this matter. She had an income well above that of Defendant and 
this appeal raises real issues of law. 
4. Defendant has shown that the written findings of fact 
for the order of modification of the decree of divorce do not 
comport with the oral findings announced from the bench in 
significant areas. Those findings should be amended to reflect 
the findings of the court as reflected by the transcript. 
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ARGUMENT 
APPELLANT HAS ESTABLISHED THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN THE AWARD OF VISITATION, 
The first point is that the issue is not extended visitation 
as Plaintiff would have this court believe, but visitation in 
total over the entirety of the year, The fact is that with the 
Plaintiff moving to California, weekend, usual holiday, and other 
short period visitation is impractical, if not impossible. 
The standard of review cited by Plaintiff, that of an abuse 
of discretion, is the standard of review for custody issues. The 
issue presented in Nilson v. Nilson, 652 P. 2d 1323 (Utah, 1982), 
was "whether the evidence supports the trial court's determination 
that the best interests of the children are served by awarding 
custody of them to the mother/' Nilson, 652 P. 2d at 1324. 
Likewise Bake v. Bake, 772 P. 2d 461 (Utah App. 1989) dealt with 
custody modification. Bake, 772 P.2d at 462, and 464. 
In fact, all cases cited by Plaintiff in this section of her 
brief deal with custody only. Walker v. Walker, 707 P. 2d 110 
(Utah, 1985) tangentially dealt with a challenge on visitation, 
wherein the court discussed whether the visitation met the 
statute, or was unsupported by evidence and also discussed the 
choice of a health care provider to determine "remission" of a 
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mental impairment. Walker, 707 P. 2d at 112, In Walker, there 
was extensive expert testimony concerning the visiting parent's 
mental condition and how it affected relationships with the chil-
dren. Id. In the instant case, there was only Plaintiff's admis-
sion that she wanted no visitation over one week in duration based 
upon her fears. Transcript at 54, and 57 - 58. Contrary to the 
representations of Plaintiff in her brief, there was a timely ob-
jection to the alleged behavior of Defendant during the marriage. 
See, transcript at 33 at which point upon challenge, Plaintiff 
simply indicated to the court that she would move on to other mat-
ters with the court so instructing her to do. Hence that testi-
mony should have been excluded from consideration by the court. 
Defendant does concur with Plaintiff that the best interests 
of the children are of prime consideration. This court has re-
cently discussed the value of visitation and stated that the best 
interests of the children are promoted by having a strong 
relationship with the non-custodial parent by way of visitation. 
Dana v. Dana, 789 P. 2d 726 (Utah Ct.App. 1990.) is one such 
case. In Dana this court stated that "[f]ostering a child's rela-
tionship with the non custodial parent has an important bearing on 
the child's best interests." Dana 789 P. 2d at 730 (citation 
omitted). 
This court through Judge Greenwood directly affirmed and 
quoted Dana in Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), 
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addressing the value of visitation. This court stated that 
"The best interests of a minor child are promoted by 
having the child respect and love both parents. 
Postering a child's relationship with the non custodial 
parent has an important bearing on the child's best in-
terest.' Dana v. Dana, 789 P.2d 726, 730 (Utah Ct.App. 
1990). Visitation by a non custodial parent helps to 
develop this bonding of respect and love. Interference 
by the custodial parent with a non custodial parent's 
visitation rights as ordered by the court may clearly be 
contrary to a child's best interests. Entwistle v. 
Entwistle, 61 A.D. 2d 380, 402 N.Y.S. 2d 2-13, 215-216 
(1978) ("It is readily apparent that the respondent's 
very act of preventing the [minor children] . . . from 
seeing and being with their father is an act so incon-
sistent with the best interests of the children as to, 
per se, raise a strong probability that the mother is 
unfit to act as custodial parent.") 
Smithy 793 P. 2d at 410 (emphasis and omissions in the origi-
nal ). 
By significantly decreasing the amount of time that Defendant 
has with the minor children in this case, the trial court has 
severely limited the ability to foster and maintain those bonds of 
love and affection referred to in Smith. In raising this issue, 
Defendant does not assert "mathematical precision" as Plaintiff 
asserts, Defendant uses the numbers to show in an easily under-
stand way just how much his access to the children is signifi-
cantly decreased. 
That is also the reason for Defendant's citation to the 
standardized visitation schedule set forth by the Third District 
court. Quite simply stated, Defendant is deprived of visitation, 
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a valuable opportunity to foster his relationship with his sons, 
to an extent well below that which he and the two boys would enjoy 
under those guidelines, simply because Plaintiff removed those 
children from this state. 
When there is a change of circumstance, consisting of the 
removal of the children from this state, does the visitation order 
that existed before that change control visitation after the 
change? Defendant asserts that it does not control the subsequent 
visitation. Defendant and the two boys should have at least as 
much access to visitation to foster the parent-child relationship, 
as they enjoyed it before the move, if the same can realistically 
and economically be accomplished. 
The standardized visitation schedule would have granted 
Defendant a calculable number of opportunities to enhance 
Defendant's relationship with the two children. Commissioner 
Arnett's recommendation is representative of an experienced com-
missioner attempting to approach that amount of time spent with 
the children. While his statements are merely a recommendation 
and made without benefit of full trial, they are reflective of a 
person with knowledge and ability in these matters based upon 
hearing representations of the same facts and arguments of the 
parties later heard by Judge Stirba. He recognized the changed 
circumstances and recommended more visitation than the court 
awarded. The trial court made its award based upon Defendant's 
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historical extended visitation record, that Plaintiff controlled. 
Record at 174 - 175 and transcript at 57. 
If this court finds that the abuse of discretion standard is 
the appropriate standard to be applied in this case, then 
Defendant has shown that the court has abused its discretion in 
severely limiting Defendant's visitation to less than he had be-
fore the change. This action of the trial court severely affects 
Defendant's relationship with the children, the maintenance of 
which is recognized as being in the best interests of the child-
ren, and is not support by any finding of harm, past or present, 
to the children in allowing a comparable amount of visitation. 
THE CHILD CARE EXPENSE AWARD IS UNREASONABLE AND 
INAPPROPRIATE AND DEFENDANT HAS SHOWN THAT THE AWARD WAS 
UNREASONABLE. 
Plaintiff's recognition of the fact that §§ 78-45-7.7 and 
-7.8, Utah Code Annot. (1990) apply to this case is very helpful 
to Defendant, for that is very much the basis for this part of 
Defendant's appeal of the trial court's ruling. Plaintiff's cir-
cular argument on this issue shows the dilemma faced by Defendant. 
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant has the protections afforded 
by those statutes, yet relies on the flat monthly payment. With 
the flat monthly payment, there is no accounting. These statutes, 
to work properly, require an accounting. Defendant has shown that 
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Plaintiff tried to charge him with day care costs for her honey-
moon and Plaintiff has never denied this point. Without the 
accounting, how does the Defendant know that the expense is not 
being incurred so that he may suspend payment as allowed under the 
statute? Furthermore, why is it that when Defendant did attempt 
to suspend payment during a time when the two boys were with him 
for two two-week periods that Plaintiff filed an order to show 
cause for payment for those two periods, obtained a finding that 
Defendant had to pay Plaintiff for day care for those periods and 
that Defendant was not to again attempt such a termination of pay-
ment? 
This is the exact quandary which Defendant faces. He cannot 
know exactly what is being spent for day care, whether day care is 
work related nor can he stop paying if the children are receiving 
day care. The record in this matter shows a history of abuses by 
Plaintiff of the day care claims. Record at 253 - 254, 256 - 257, 
and 259 - 261. This is a clear statement of the error the trial 
court made in making this determination and the clear violation of 
the intent of these statutory safeguards. 
There is a second aspect of Defendant's appeal on this issue, 
which is the question of whether it is reasonable under the 
statutes that the day care provider be "on call" while the child-
ren are in school and that this "on call" be equated with day 
care. The trial court included this "on call" status as day care. 
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Transcript at 7 8 - 7 9 . 
The transcript shows that there was no "on call" person until 
just a couple of months before the trial of this matter. 
Transcript at 45. The children had day care only after school. 
Id. 
Plaintiff also assert that her new husband is an appropriate 
provider for the children. Plaintiff's counterclaim at HH 2d and 
3g. and record at 146 and 148, respectively. Therefore there are 
two adults available for emergencies at school. 
The statutes involved herein concern work related day care to 
the children, not mere "on call" while the children are in school. 
It is an abuse of discretion to require Defendant to pay for one-
half of this "on call" status where there is no direct benefit to 
the children. 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY FEE'S AND COSTS 
INCURRED IN THE DEFENSE OF THIS MATTER. 
The Plaintiff now raises a claim for an award of her attorney 
fees and costs incurred on appeal. The cases cited by Plaintiff 
upon close examination do not fully support her stated position. 
Carter v. Carter, 584 P. 2d 904 (Utah, 1978), did allow that 
defendant an award of attorney fees on appeal. Carter^ 584 P. 2d 
at 906. That was not based upon §30-3-3, Utah Code Annot. (1953, 
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as amended). A review of Carter shows no citation of a Utah Code 
section in the entirety of the opinion. 
Furthermore, the award of attorney fees in Carter is based 
solely upon defendant's request, without any basis other than the 
fact that the plaintiff therein prosecuted the appeal. Justice 
Maughn raised this point in his dissent wherein he dissented "from 
the rationale used to support the award of costs and attorney 
fees, on appeal, to defendant, viz., because plaintiff was unwill-
ing to abide by the trial court judgment. Such a rationale 
appears to me to be in terrorem. " Carter, 584 P. 2d at 906. 
This type of "in terrorem" has been limited by this court, 
otherwise every losing party would be responsible for the fees and 
costs of the winning party on appeal. Such a rule would have an 
extreme chilling effect upon the entire appellate process. 
Chilling of the right to appeal has been a concern of this 
court for some time. In Maughn, 770 P. 2d 156 (Utah Ct.App, 1989), 
cited by Plaintiff as being authority on this issue, this court 
stated that requests for attorney fees and costs on appeal are 
generally pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
and that such sanctions would be "applied only in egregious cases, 
*lest there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal 
erroneous lower court decisions.'" Maughn, 770 P.2d at 162. 
Maughn is also distinguishable from the instant case in an-
other way. Besides asking for an award of fees and costs under 
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Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Paulette Maughn 
claimed that she could not afford the appeal, and as the trial 
court had awarded her attorney fees, so should this court. 
Maughn, 770 P. 2d at 162. This court recognized the record of 
Paulette Maughn*s financial need and exercised its discretion in 
awarding Paulette Maughn her attorney fees on appeal. Maughn, 770 
P. 2d at 163. 
In the instant case, attorney fees were awarded to neither 
party at the trial court level. Neither party has challenged 
that. Furthermore, the record clearly shows that Plaintiff is not 
in financial need, having a monthly income of almost twice that of 
Defendant. Transcript at 12, 26, 48, and 67, and record at 169 -
175. Therefore, there is no basis under Maughn for an award of 
fees and costs to Plaintiff. 
In Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 292 P. 214 (Utah, 1930), Plaintiff 
was awarded attorney fees on appeal. Dahlberg^ 292 P. at 218. But 
Plaintiff was the one who brought the appeal. Plaintiff was not 
defending the appeal. This is the exact opposite of the position 
of the Plaintiff in the instant case and supports the position 
that the Defendant in this case should be awarded his fees and 
costs incurred in prosecuting this appeal. 
Returning to the improper chilling referred to in Maughn, the 
Plaintiff cites as the basis for an award of attorney fees the 
fact that Defendant is a licensed attorney allowed to practice law 
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in this state. Plaintiff does not ask the court to consider the 
financial status of the parties, Plaintiff was earning approxi-
mately twice that which Defendant was earning (transcript at 67), 
nor does she cite that this matter is frivolous or unfounded, two 
of the major basis for and award of fees on appeal. 
An award of attorney fees based on Defendant's being an 
attorney, if allowed, would be violative of equal protection 
clauses of the United States Constitution as well as the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. Articles 5 and 14, United 
States Constitution and §§1, 7, 11 and 24 of Article 1 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah. It would be singling out a 
class of citizens, attorneys, as being liable for fees incurred in 
litigation involving those attorneys personally. What could be 
more chilling to attorneys who are personally involved in suits 
but that the specter of an order of attorney fees and costs 
against them is very likely simply because that individual is an 
attorney? 
Furthermore, how would the court handle pro se litigants. 
Pro se litigants, by definition, do not incur any attorney fees on 
their part. Should all pro se litigants have to pay the opposing 
party's attorney fees and costs on appeal? Defendant respectfully 
suggests that such a stance would have such a chilling effect upon 
pro se litigation that individuals would not dare to litigate a 
matter, or prosecute an appeal, pro se. 
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So if pro se litigants can come before the courts of this 
land without automatically being subject to a judgment for attor-
ney fees against them because of their status, why should 
Defendant pay Plaintiff's attorney fees even if for the sake of 
argument he has assisted his counsel in the prosecution of this 
matter? This court must find some other reason and basis and 
Defendant asserts that there is no other such reason or basis. 
It is clear from the content of this appeal and the issues 
presented that this case is one of first impression, and that a 
request for the interpretation of the statutes raised and rules 
referred to in this matter is permitted. 
DEFENDANT HAS MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS CLAIM 
THAT SOME OF THE WRITTEN FINDINGS ENTERED BY THE COURT WERE 
ERRONEOUS. 
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant's challenge that some of the 
written findings are clearly erroneous must fail due to her alle-
gation that Defendant has failed to marshal evidence as required 
under Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P. 2d 198, 199 (Utah, 1991). This 
assertion is contained in one paragraph at the end of point 1 of 
Plaintiff's argument. 
Defendant has marshalled the evidence. There is a transcript 
of the pronouncement of findings from the bench. Transcript at 
7 0 - 8 2 . Defendant's objection notes the specific errors in the 
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written findings. Record at 211-213. Those written additions to 
the oral pronouncement of the court which were objected to by 
Defendant's counsel were clearly never orally stated by the court, 
otherwise the transcript would contain them. The discrepancies 
between the oral pronouncement as contained in the transcript and 
the written findings constitute sufficient evidence under Saunders 
to substantiate Defendants claims on this issue. This court may 
properly consider those oral findings expressed from the bench by 
way of the transcript. Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P. 2d 1172 (Utah 
Ct.App., 1990). 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant has established that the trial court abused its 
discretion in its award of visitation by substantially limiting 
the time allowed the Defendant with the two boys and in 
considering the limited amount of visitation allowed by Plaintiff 
prior to Plaintiff's move to California as a basis for limiting 
Defendant's ongoing visitation. 
Defendant has shown that the trial court has erred in its 
award of a fixed amount of day care where that day care includes 
"on call" periods when the children are not present. The court 
further erred by denying the protections allowed to Defendant by 
the statutes cited above in its setting of a flat fee without any 
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requirement to show that the day care is actually work-related. 
Defendant should be granted the full benefit of the protection 
allowed by those statutes as argued by Defendant and admitted by 
Plaintiff in her brief. 
Plaintiff should not be awarded her attorney fees and costs 
incurred in the defense of this appeal. Plaintiff has shown no 
basis or need in law or fact for that such an award. 
Defendant has marshalled sufficient evidence to show that the 
challenged portions of the written findings of fact do not comport 
with the ruling of the court. Therefore those findings must be 
amended to following the oral findings as supported by the tran-
script in this matter. 
Respectfully submitted this X ' day of March, 1993. 
k 
7
 ' KATHRYN S. DENHOLM, ESQ. 
Attorney for Appellant / Defendant 
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ADDENDUM 
Amend. V CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases,] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than ac-
cording to the rules of the common law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel 
and unusual punishments inflicted. 
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AMENDMENTS Amend. XIV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
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DECLARATION OF RIGHTS Art. I, § 1 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS 
Section Section 
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 16. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Li-
2. [All political power inherent in the people.] be!.] 
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
 1 6 . [ N o imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
4. [Religious liberty - No property quahfica-
 17# ( E l e c t l 0 I i a to ^ f r e e _ s ^ ^ , v o t m g . ] 
6. [Habeas c o S t f " * lAttainder^ Ex post fact, laws-Impair. 
6. [Right to bear arms.]
 1 0 rffV. « * «ntr«d^l 
7. [Due process of law.] 19- [Treason defined — Proof] 
8. (Offenses bailable] 20* (Military subordinate to the cml power.] 
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punish- 21. [Slavery forbidden ] 
menta.] 22. [Private property for public use.] 
10. [Trial by jury.] 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
11. (Courts open — Redress of injuries J 24. (Uniform operation of laws ] 
12. (Rights of accused persons] 26. [Rights retained by people.] 
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment
 26. (Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
— Grand jury.]
 27. [Fundamental rights.] 
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issu-
ance of warrant.] 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to enjoy and defend their 
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship accord-
ing to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against 
wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
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Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
Sec* 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person 
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this 
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
History: Const 1896. vate or special laws, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec 
Cross-References. — Prohibition on pri- 26. 
